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THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND
THE ILLICIT ACT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*
THE RATIONALE OF THE ILLICIT ACT'
HE international illicit act consists of the transgression of an
obligation established and defined by an international juridical
norm which is accompanied by damage suffered by the injured
party.2
The transgression creates a new juridical situation since the rela-
tionship of the parties involved takes on the nature of transgressor
and injured party. To constitute a transgression, one of the parties has
to violate an existing right or breach a duty jointly established be-
tween the parties or accepted by either one of them'
To any international obligation corresponds a state of fact. The
breach of said obligation will constitute an illicit act when it occurs,
even though it occurs when the norm does not expressly foresee it.
The act is not necessarily unlawful per se but will be illicit if its results
constitute a derogation from a right or the failure to perform a duty;
this can be achieved by commission or omission. However, such an
I For the rationale of the illicit act, see generally GROTIUS (de Groot), LE DROIT
DES GENS; I GUGGENHEIM, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1953); KELSEN,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1952); SCELLE, MANUEL ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC; VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS (1916).
2 See generally 1 GUGGENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 1; OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1948); ROUSSEAU, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1953); ROUSSEAU, PRINCIPLES
GENERAUX DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1946). BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 636 (2d
ed. 1962), refers to it as tortious conduct. On the definition of tortious conduct, see
generally Chattin (United States v. Mexico), [1927] Opinions of Comm'rs Under the
Convention Concluded Sept. 8, 1923, Between the United States and Mexico 422. For
the establishment of the General Claims Commission, see generally 43 Stat. 1730 (1924),
4 TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS 4441 (1937). On conduct creating
liability, see BISHOP, op. cit. supra.
3 Supra, notes 1 and 2. DEL BEZ, MANUEL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1951).
* MR. BASSIOUNI received his A.B. from the College of the Holy Family, Cairo, his
Lic.D. from the Cairo University Faculty of Law and his L.L.B. from the Indiana
University School of Law. Mr. Bassiouni is an Assistant Professor of Law in the
De Paul University College of Law. He is chairman of the Arabic-Language-Speaking
Countries of the World Peace Through Law Center and the World Conference of
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act will not constitute an illicit act unless it upsets an "order of things,"
i.e., an order established by treaty or irternational principles of law
among nations. The material interpretation of said reversal of an
"order of things" is measured by the existence of damages. Whether
direct or indirect, they will determine the rupture of the established
international relationship. 4 The illicit act will create a new situation
of fact resulting from the change in the: nature and character of the
relationship then in existence between the parties.5
We can conclude that the illicit act i; the violation of an interna-
tional duty which injures or damages one of the parties involved.
Every violation definitely imputable can be followed by sanctions, but
certain conditions precedent must exist in order that these sanctions
may be fully exercised:
1. The imputability of conduct contrary to promises or right-duty
relations established or accepted by international agreement.
2. The damage that occurs as a result of such conduct.
3. The lack of express justification and good faith.
According to the Permanent Court of International Justice
(P.C.I.J.), "It is a principle of international law that the violation of
an obligation bears a corresponding obligation to restore damages in
an adequate form;" this is one of the fundamental principles of inter-
national law. The failure must either be expressly foreseen in the con-
vention or agreement or implicitly recognized. In a case where it may
not be apparent or obviously implied, the general principles of inter-
national law will define the character of the conduct and determine
the degree of liability. Therefore, we can add that any illicit act is
not only a failure to perform an international obligation resulting from
an international agreement, but also that it results from a duty im-
posed by the general principles of international law as established by
valid precedents. It is obvious that the above conditions are necessary
for the valid existence of the principle of imputability of an illicit act.
4Supra, notes 1 and 2. See also FRIEDMANN, LAWv IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (1959); 5
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (192j7); O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE
SuccEssIoN (1956); McNair, The General Principles Recognized by Civilized Nations,
33 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1 (1957); O'Connell, State 3uccession and Problems of Treaty
Interpretation, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 41 (1964); Re.,ponsibility of States in Territorial
Waters, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp. 1929).
I RoussEAu, op. cit. supra note 2; Friedmann, The Uses of "General Principles" in
the Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. [ r'L L. 279 (1963).
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The question consists of the determination of the elements to put in
motion the effects of imputability.'
The illicit act or conduct is essentially materialized in the develop-
ment of an activity, conduct or methods of a political character or of
general direction that may be qualified as legislative or legal activities
in the national and internal sense. What may seem justified or un-
justified in the view of national legislation or national political activi-
ties may not be the same in the eyes of international law. (Where
the same conduct bears a double-barreled result of internal injustice
and international illegality, this is but pure coincidence.)
Often an international illicit act is legal nationally, while an unjust
or unfair national act or course of conduct will be legal in the sense
of international law. This is one of the effects of sovereignty as rec-
ognized by the United Nations Charter in art. 2, para. 7.7 There is no
interpenetration in the results provoked by the same conduct in the
eyes of international and national law. They are both quite distinct and
do not derive from the same source, although the act that produced
them may be the same.
The opinions of Mr. Spiropoulos 8 are opposed to those of Mr.
Kelsen9 in that respect, and Mr. Anzillotti10 considers the results pro-
duced by the act of any state, even if they bear a dual internal and
international result, completely distinct and thus one cannot influence
the other. As Mr. George Scelle puts it, "This is a real phenomenon of
dedoublement (duality).""
Certain proponents of the Monisme 12 theory avoid the subject of
necessary damage as a condition precedent to the principle of imputa-
bility of an illicit act. However, in my opinion the imputability of
an illicit act under the Monisme theory would be a mere formality
entailing a blame which would not even have the effect of moral
blame and would go no further than the exchange of diplomatic notes.
6 See generally BISHOP, op. cit. supra note 2; GUGGENHEIM, Op. cit. supra note 1;
OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 2; REUTER, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1956).
7 See generally supra notes 5 and 6, and the U.N. Charter.
8 SPIROPOULOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW.
9 KELsEN, Op. cit. supra note 1.
10 ANZILLOTrI, CORSO DI DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE.
it SCELLE, Op. cit. supra note 1.
12 The Monisme theory is the Unitarian Theory of Judicial Order. See generally
KELSEN, Op. cit. supra note 1; and SCELLE, op. cit. supra note 1.
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Only actual resulting damage can render effective the imputability of
an act, as to whether it should be followed by restoration or sanc-
tions. 13
To consider an act illicit when it starts in operation but remains
without consequences or damages would weaken international law
and would render ineffective the principle of imputability whenever
actual results would require its application.
This is why, in view of the actual status and stage of development
of international law, I express the opinion that to establish the princi-
ple of imputability of an illicit act or conduct, two conditions must
be present: the illicit act of the transgressor must proximately cause
the breach of a right duty relationship and some damage must be in-
curred by the injured party. 4
The future development of international law and international jus-
tice will create a body of doctrine and jurisprudence that may, as the
time requires, enlarge or restrict the interpretation of what constitutes
damages or injury. Although the elements of good faith and inten-
tions are important in the field of internal law, I do not feel that the
same would apply to international law except insofar as justifications
are concerned, and as a parallel I would view it as a problem of strict
liability rather than intentional tort. It is the act creating the trans-
gression of an international duty (or obligation), affecting the rights
of others and producing damage or injury that will be considered
when determining whether an illicit act has occurred, regardless of
any possible circumstances advocated in the explanation of the act or
any possible operational excuses which should not affect the result.
The result is a new situation of fact which is the product of conduct
which produced damages or injured a party through another party's
failure to exercise or execute an international obligation. The failure
to exercise or execute an international legal duty by commission or
omission, which results in the injury to a third party as a direct or
13 GUGGENHEIM, Op. cit. supra note 1; HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS IN-
TERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES (1922); Friedmann, supra note 5.
14 FRIEDMANN, op. cit. supra note 4; GUGGENHEIM, Op. cit. supra note 1; McNair,
The Seizure of Property and Enterprises in ln~ionesia, 6 NETHERLANDS L. REV. 218
(1959); O'Connell, op. cit. supra note 4. The Third Committee of The Hague Codifica-
tion Conference of 1930 adopted the following article which was not acted upon then
by the Conference: "Article 9. International reiponsibility is incurred by a state if
damage is sustained."
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proximate cause, is sufficient to require reparation. Good faith will
be a factor to restrict or extend the blame, but not to excuse it or
exclude reparation."
As the P.C.I.J. 16 defined it in a decree (advice) of 1926, "In the
eyes of international law and of the court, which is its organ, the
national laws are simple facts, manifestations of the will and activity
of the states just as their judicial decisions or administrative measures."
A national law may not materialize in an illicit international act per se,
though an illicit international act can become illegal in internal law by
the mere fact of its international illegality. The principle of sover-
egnty and independence will be a bar to it.17 In decree No. 7,11 the
P.C.I.J. stated that if nothing requires it to interpret a national law, nei-
ther does anything preclude it from expressing itself on the question
of whether in the application of a national law or in the promulgation
of its laws, a nation has acted in conformity with the obligations im-
posed by international law. The effect of the unitarian concept of the
State in international law is that no juridical pertinence will derive
from the imputation of international responsibility in the fashion in
which the activity is materialzed from the natonal standpoint in rela-
tionship to the violation of the international duty.
These principles and the one enunciated by the court as quoted
above are an expression of the development of principles of interna-
tional law which attempt to protect the rights and property of indi-
viduals of foreign nationality in a territory other than their national
territory, and said foreign territory may promulgate laws which by
15 See supra note 14. See generally Bindschedler, La protection de la propriete prive
en droit international public, 90 HAGUE ACADEMIE RECUEIL DES COURS 173 (II, 1956);
WHITE, NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY (1961). Regarding the difficulty of
measuring damages in international claims, see 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 718 (1927); WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1937-43); Eagleton,
Measure of Damages in International Law, 39 YALE L.J. 52 (1929).
16 On the Permanent Court of International Justice, see generally HUDSON, THE
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-1942 (1943); LAUTERPACHT, DE-
VELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE ITERNATIONAL COURT (1958).
17 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. See also the views on principles of sovereignty in
international law by authors op. cit. supra note 1.
18 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 7 at 22-24 (1926); see supra note 16. See generally Guggen-
heim, Referat uber Vdlkkerrech, 6 Swiss Ya. INT'L L. 124 (1949). Domke, American
Protection Against Foreign Expropriation in Light of the Suez Crisis, 105 U. PA. L.
REV. 1033 (1957), states that a basic tenet of international law is that expropriation
will be recognized only when accompanied by adequate, effective, and proper com-
pensation.
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their enforcement could become the basis of an illicit act or conduct
in international law.19
THE JURIDICAL SITUATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL
Following the nationalization of the Suez Canal, various polemics
of a legal and political order arose and the event in question provided
the opportunity for many legal researches which are of interest to
students of political science and international law. In the course of
these studies and discussions relative to the Suez crisis and the present
status of the Suez Canal, the question is very often posed as to whether
the problem should be approached by applying general principles of
national law and existing conventions or as a new situation of facts
and law as a result of the nationalization by the Egyptian Government
of the Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal.2 °
In view of the existing juridical situation of the Suez Canal, it is
important and indispensable to divide t:he subject into two distinct
phases: 21 (1) the Maritime Suez Canal and (2) the Universal Com-
pany of the Maritime Suez Canal.
THE MARITIME SUEZ CANAL
The Maritime Suez Canal links the Mediterranean to the Red Sea
through the lakes of Amer and Timsah. The Canal has been and still
is governed by the Convention of Constantinople of October 29,
1888.22 The parties to the Convention were France, Germany, the
9  See supra note 15. See generally WORTLEY, EM'ROPRIATION IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1959); O'Connell, State Succession and Problems of Treaty Interpretation, 58
AM. J. INT'L L. 41 (1964); Note, The Examination of Foreign Expropriation Decrees
Under International Law, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 979 (1961).
2 0 La Compagnie Universelle Du Canal De Suez.
21 The Suez Canal Problem, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE BULL., July 26-Sept. 22, 1956, p.
30; EL-HEFNAWY, LES PROBLEMES CONTEMPORAIN: DU CANAL BE SUEZ (1953); SCELLE,
op. cit. supra note 1; Delson, Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company: Issues of
Public and Private International Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 755 (1957); Domke, supra
note 18; Finch, Navigation and Use of the Suez Canal Company in International Law,
30 U.W. AUSTL. ANN. L. REV. - (1957). Huang, Some International and Legal As-
pects of the Suez Canal Question, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 277 (1957); Lauterpacht, The
Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of International Law-
Survey and Comment, VIII, 9 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 253 (1960); Scelle, La nationalization
du Canal de Suez, 2 ANN. FRANCAIS DU DROIT INTERNATIONALE 3 (1956); Note, Na-
tionalization of the Suez Canal Company, 70 HAFv. L. REV. 480 (1957).
22 Supra note 2. Regarding free navigation tlhrough the Suez Canal, see generally
Martens, La convention de Constantinople 1888, NOUVEAU RECUEIL GENERAL DE TRAITe
266; Finch, supra note 21.
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Austrian-Hungarian Empire, Spain, Great Britain, Italy, Holland,
Russia and Turkey, and the Convention was subsequently ratified
by Egypt. This Convention recognized the national character of the
Canal as a maritime waterway without diminishing its international
importance. The Convention consists of seventeen articles, takes
notice of prior conventions and concessions, and establishes the gen-
eral principles of navigation through the Canal and the regulations
corresponding to such navigation, thereby finally establishing the
status of the waterway.
THE STATUS OF THE CANAL AND THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
23
The juridical status of the Canal was established by the 1888 Con-
vention, which promulgated the rules under which ships in time of
peace and war are to use the Canal, defined the conditions of transit,
assured the equality of all flags, guaranteed the rights of the users to
transit without distinction or preference, and prohibited the militari-
zation of the Canal Zone so that in time of war the security and right
of free passage may not be hindered. Thus, by establishing these prin-
ciples, the act, meaning the Convention that created them, created a
principle of international law formally obligating the parties to the
Convention to the duties arising therefrom.
The Convention proceeded without ambiguity to delegate to Egypt
the material powers of execution of these principles and obligations.2 4
Egypt has therefore received the entire obligation and responsibility
for the execution of these principles. The authority and prerogative
of execution and application of the Convention are delegated by all
parties to the Convention to Egypt. It seems, therefore, that Egypt
remains the only judge as to the necessary measures to be taken to
implement the language and the spirit of the Convention. No foreign
power, whether a party to the Convention or not, can delegate or
lend to Egypt its forces or means of action in the execution of these
principles. This in no sense can be construed as a discretionary power
granted to Egypt to take measures not in conformity with the stipu-
lations of the Convention. This unilateral right of Egypt to the ma-
terial application of the principles of the Convention imposes upon
Egypt the obligation of exercising them diligently. The failure of
23 Supra note 22.
24 Convention of Constantinople of 1888, art. 9, states: "The Egyptian Govern-
ment is to take ... the necessary measures to enforce the execution of said treaty. .. ."
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Egypt to comply with this international obligation gives rise to inter-
national liability. Egypt, by her ratification of the Convention, obli-
gated herself to the material and concrete execution of the principles
enunciated in the Convention, and her failure to do so would consti-
tute a failure to comply with an international duty. The Convention
did not stop at merely enunciating general principles and charging
Egypt with its application, but stipulated in Article 14 that the obli-
gations resulting from the present treaty will not be limited by "the
duration of the concessions granted to the Universal Company of the
Suez Canal." Article 14 is important in that it definitely determines
the separation of the Universal Company, with the grants and conces-
sions obtained by it, from the Convention, which establishes the juridi-
cal status of international navigation through the waterway.
The Maritime Suez Canal is, in compliance with Article 14, a mari-
time waterway, the international importance of which requires the
guarantee of free navigation and unmolested passage, which is ex-
pressed in an international treaty. The scope of this treaty is extended
to free passage and guarantees of non-discrimination against users.
The execution of this treaty is the exclusive responsibility of Egypt,
and her transgression or failure to comply with it would create an
unconditional right in the injured party to request compliance with
the principles of the treaty.
Therefore, we can conclude that the Canal, as a maritime waterway,
cannot be presumed or inferred to be international,25 but that the
principles of the Convention create an international right-duty rela-
tionship, the violation of which would constitute a transgression and
hence an illicit act in the sense of international law.
The Canal remains exclusively Egypian regardless of its interna-
tional importance. Her sovereignty and prerogatives are limited only
by the Convention and the principles enunciated therein. Therefore,
it is within the framework or limits established by the Convention
that the full sovereignty of Egypt can be exercised. Sovereignty is the
general rule and the principles of the Convention are but an exception
to it. This will be important in the inte:lpretation of the principles if
there is any conflict between the two, since exceptions are always in-
terpreted in the restrictive sense.
25 See EL-HEFNAWY, op. cit. supra note 21; Delson, op. cit. supra note 21; Hyde,
Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 854
(1956).
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The affirmation and confirmation that the Canal is an internal mari-
time waterway, exclusively Egyptian, are not only apparent in the
Convention but also from the various documents preceding it which
marked the creation of the Canal as well as the various international
acts of recognition by the nations which signed the Convention of
1888.20
THE CHARACTER OF THE CANAL
2 7
Article 12 of the Convention of 1866 expressly affirms the character
of the Egyptian public domain of the Canal.28 Article 10 of the Fara-
man of November 30, 1854 recognizes clearly that the Canal has been
pierced on properties of Egyptian public domain and is therefore
property of the state of Egypt. Articles 11, 12, 13 and 16 of the Fara-
man of January 5, 186629 and Article 4 of the Convention of Febru-
ary 22, 18 66 o are also worthy of citation insofar as they reflect the
26 On the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, see "The Tripartite State-
ment of August 3, 1956," The Suez Canal Problem, U.S. DEGT. OF STATE BULL., supra
note 21, at 35, wherein it was expressly mentioned that "the Governments of France,
the United Kingdom and the United States do not question the right of Egypt to
enjoy and exercise all privileges of a fully sovereign and independent nation, includ-
ing the generally recognized right under appropriate conditions to nationalize assets
not impressed with an international interest which are subject to its political authority."
On the work of the U.N. in regard to the political and security questions concern-
ing the nationalization of the Suez Canal, see EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONs 80 (1964);
U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 7th Sess., Plenary 493-501 (Res. No. 626) (1952).
27 See Convention of Constantinople of 1888, Faraman of Nov. 30, 1954; Faraman
of Jan. 5, 1956; Convention of Feb. 22, 1886 infra note 30. A "Faraman" is the Arabic
word for a decree by the sovereign. In this case, it is a decree granting power and
authority to M. DeLesseps to undertake his venture. See also Anglo-Egyptian Treaty
of 1936 (CMD. 1936) and Anglo Egyptian Treaty of 1954 (CMD. No. 9298 1954).
28 Convention of 1866 art. 12: "However, all rights of Turkey as the territorial power
are reserved." Egypt was then territorially part of Turkey and when Egypt ratified
the treaty, the Convention of Constantinople of 1888, and gained full independence, she
assumed all rights of sovereignty as the territorial power.
29 Faraman of November 30, 1854 art. 10 refers to the right of Egypt to take measures
of defense, use her own military forces and maintain public order. The Faraman of
Jan. 5, 1866 art. 11 refers to the grant of land and conditions of such grants, and
future taxes if the land would be used for agricultural purposes. Art. 12 is a grant
by the Government of privately owned land and the establishment of a condemna-
tion board acting as arbitrators for the evaluation of indemnification. Art. 13 states:
"The Egyptian Government grants the company-grantee for the duration of the grant
the privilege of excavating mines and quarries belonging to the public domain ......
Art. 16 states that the duration of the company and of the grant is ninety-nine years
from the date of completion of the canal.
30 Contrat du Vice-Roit d'Egypte avec la Compagnie Universelle du Canal Mari-
time de Suez art. 4 (1866) prohibits the company from using the land for any
speculations. See supra 29 for art. 13, which specifies duration of the grant.
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same concept of Egyptian public domain of all land and property
through which the Canal runs.
This reflects the character of ownership of the property involved,
since it is within the territorial confines and borders of Egypt. The
sovereignty of Egypt over the territory involved is demonstrated by
other stipulations in the various grants, concessions, Faramans and
Conventions. In various ways these stipulations define the conditions
of piercing the Isthmus, the exploitations,3 1 passage, transit, etc.; all
clearly demonstrate Egyptian sovereignty and do not infer in any way
the abandonment or delegation of such sovereignty. Article 9 of the
Faraman of February 22, 1866 dissipates every possible equivoque.
The Canal and all its depending property remain subject to the Egyp-
tian police, who will "exercise freely as on any other part of the ter-
ritory in order to insure good order, public safety and the execution of
the laws and regulations of the country." The citation speaks for itself
and it is followed by Article 14 of the 1888 Convention which does
not attempt to encroach upon the sovereign right of Egypt. We can
conclude safely and unequivocally that the Canal itself, its property,
and territory form an integral part of Egyptian territory as a public
domain. Furthermore, in examining the 1888 Convention and in light
of the situation existing at that time, it is obvious that the Convention,
far from limiting the sovereign rights of Egypt, took care to underline
them. This is why Article 9 imposes on Egypt and Egypt alone the
obligation of taking the necessary measures for the execution of said
treaty.32 It also determines to what extent prior Conventions, Fara-
mans and grants, which were not limited by the 1888 Convention, are
valid following the 1888 Convention.
The preamble of the 1888 Convention refers to the 1866 Faraman
which, in Article 17, affirms the prior grants, concessions, and conven-
tions, whereas Article 10 of the 1854 Faraman was a grant to Ferdi-
nand DeLesseps and stipulated, "At the expiration of this concession,
Egypt will succeed to the rights of the Company without any reserve
and will have full ownership of the Canal of the two seas and all in-
stallations thereof." Similar provisions appear in Article 16 of the 1856
concession. Finally, let us take note of Article 8 of the Anglo-
31 By exploitation, we mean management, operation, administration, development
and any other activity which such a venture would require. The word exploit is so
used in the original French documents, cited and translated herein by the author.
32 Supra note 24.
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Egyptian treaty of 19 54 :3 "The Maritime Suez Canal, which is an
integral part of Egypt . -"4 Great Britain was a signatory to the
1888 Convention.
Thus we conclude that the Canal itself, as a waterway, was and al-
ways has been an integral part of the Egyptian territory and therefore
the nationalization of the Universal Company of the Suez Canal has
nothing to do with the Maritime Canal, and the theory that there is no
distinction between the company and the waterway as a Maritime
Canal is without foundation.35
The Maritime Suez Canal is subject to Egyptian laws,3 6 although its
international juridical status derives from the 1888 Convention, which
establishes general principles which were delegated for execution to
the sole sovereign of the territory. The users have the right to the
execution of the 1888 principles but in no way can participate in the
management of the Canal, its control, or execution of the 1888 Con-
vention. Whereas one may invoke the Convention and request its exe-
cution in the case of a flag being discriminated against, one may not
invoke the right to the management of the Canal itself, claiming this
as part of the right of the users under the cover of the preservation of
the freedom of navigation.
33 Supra note 26.
34 That the canals are integral parts of the national territory in which they are built
results in the fact that they are artificially erected waterways. OPPENFIRIM, APPENDICUM
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed. 1955).
35 Supra note 22. EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS, op. cit. supra note 26, at 80: "On
July 26, 1956, Egypt proclaimed the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and
placed the management of the Canal in the hands of an Egyptian operating authority.
The decree provided for compensation to the stockholders in the Canal Company
on the basis of the market value of the shares.
"At a meeting of the United Nations Security Council on October 13, a resolution
was unanimously adopted by which it was agreed that any settlement of the Suez
question should meet six requirements which had previously been agreed to in the
course of private meetings-held in the office of the Secretary-General-of the Ministers
for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, France, and the United Kingdom. The requirements
were: (1) there should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimi-
nation; (2) the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected; (3) the operation of the
Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country; (4) the manner of fixing
tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users; (5)
a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development; and (6) in case of
disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Gov-
ernment should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable
provisions for the payment of sums found to be due." U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 7th
Sess., Plenary 493-501 (Res. No. 626) (1952).
30 Law of May 2, 1935, No. 45 (Egypt) [1935]; Law of July 31, 1937, No. 73 (Egypt)
[1937]; Loi Sur Les Societe Anonyme (1947); Law of Aug. 15, 1949, No. 130 [1949]
(Egypt).
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The nationalization of the Universal Company bears consequences
exclusively on the company and not on the juridical status of the
Canal. 7
THE UNIVERSAL COMPANY OF THE MARITIME SUEZ CANAL
This is the name of the company as it oppears in the first Faraman,38
the grant to M. DeLesseps. "M. DeLesseps will constitute a Company
and we confer upon him the management of it under the name of the
Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal." This name created
many controversies and equivoques. However, it was nothing but a
commercial denomination tending to facilitate the opening of the fi-
nancial participation of European financters and underlining the idea
that the venture was without distinction of nationality. Said denomi-
nation, being commercial, is under the exclusive jurisdiction of na-
tional legislation, corporate laws, and denomination of commercial
activities. This commercial label can easily be paralleled with the one
used by the International Company of Wagon-Lits, 39 which is a Bel-
gian company. The name did not erase the national character of the
company.
The historical aspect of the company has already been examined by
other researchers. 40 As a general background, we will briefly examine
an overlooked aspect.
THE FINANCIAL ASPECT OF THE COMPANY AS IT PERTAINS TO
THE PIERCING OF THE ISTHMUS
4 1
Article 5 of the 1854 Faraman starts with the distribution of the
Canal's income: 15% to the Egyptian Government, 10% to the
charter members (founders) and 75% to the company. In 1858 the
company started with an initial capitalization of 200 million gold
francs. These were represented by 400,000 shares. Egypt under-
wrote 176,000 shares, equivalent to 44% of the company and in
1860, two years after the opening of the financial underwriting and
3 7 Supra note 21.
38 Faraman of Nov. 30, 1954, supra note 27.
39 This is the European equivalent of the Pullman railroad car.
40 Supra note 21.
41 MINISTRY OF INFORMATION OF EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, TInE WHITE BOOK ON THE
NATIONALIZATION OF THE SUEZ CANAL (1956) includes the explanatory note on the
nationalization of the Suez Canal. See also statements by Foreign Minister Fawzi,
New York Times, July 22, Oct. 9, 1956.
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after most of these stocks had made their way in the various world
markets, the company reached the verge of bankruptcy. The various
stockholders and market reports placed the blame on the financial
manipulations of the directors, and Egypt was talked into purchasing
64,000 shares at a price of 32 million gold francs. Some of these stocks
were purchased from various individuals willing to sell and it is re-
corded that among them were 25,000 shares purchased at market price,
which was 30% less than the price of issue (nominal), which Egypt
had paid. These transactions were carried out personally by M. De-
Lesseps.
Egypt had agreed to provide men to participate in the piercing of
the Isthmus, but after having paid a heavy toll in lives (120,000 men
are claimed to have died in the overall operations) Egypt abolished
forced labor on the Canal on February 22, 1866, and withdrew that
free privilege, for which she had to pay 30 million gold francs, from
the company.
By the same agreement, Egypt was induced into purchasing the
sweet-water canal42 from the company, although it was granted freely
to the company and pierced with Egyptian labor. It cost Egypt 16
million gold francs. In adition, the government had freely granted land
surrounding the Canal, as requested by the company. The government
was induced to purchase this land for 13 million gold francs. The
total amount paid in 1866 by Egypt was 84,000,000 gold francs for the
restitution of property of public domain and grants freely received by
the company.
In 1875, as a result of the expenses incurred for the formal opening
of the Canal by the Khedive Ismail, Egypt was forced to sell 166,602
shares to England. England considered this as repayment of a loan
of £4,000,000 to Egypt which was guaranteed by these shares. This
loan was at an interest rate of 4%, principal and interest payable in
20 years. This gave England £4,000,000 of interest in addition to
the £4,000,000 principal. These same shares, which England acquired
in this transaction in repayment of a £4,00,000 loan, were worth
£72,000,000 in 1929, and from 1875 to 1929 the British treasury re-
ceived a total income of £38,600,000 as dividends from them. From
1882, it should be remembered, Egypt was occupied by England, un-
42 The sweet-water canal is a canal from the Nile to the construction area running
parallel to the Suez Canal for the purpose of supplying water for the laborers con-
structing the canal and for domestic and agricultural purposes.
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der the status of a protectorate, until the first Egyptian constitution in
1929.
Unfortunately, six months prior to the formal opening of the Canal,
the company started to show signs of financial instability and the en-
tire project seemed close to bankruptcy once more. Again the blame
was placed on the directors, but Egypt came to the company's aid
and loaned it £1,250,000. This amount was considered the reasonable
consideration for the transfer of title of certain company buildings
which, however, remained in the company's possession. Since the
company was tax free, it gave up a small part of this exemption in re-
turn for permanent use of these buildings without cost. Thus Egypt
had not gained much in this transaction either.
In 1876, Egypt went through a severe financial crisis and the com-
pany purchased the government's share of the Canal revenues out-
right from the Khedive. These revenues, amounting to 15 % of the
Canal's income, brought an annual income of £869,000 and the total
price paid for the entire outright purchase was only £880,000, just a
little more than a year's income.
In summary, the company was able to obtain the sum of £3,500,000
under the pretense of indemnity for the abandonment of certain
grants or privileges, while the entire initial capitalization was only
£500,000. Under one form or another, the company obtained from
Egypt 12.5 million while the entire venture of piercing the Canal cost
16 million.43 This gives us a brief insight into the financial history of
the company.4
THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE UNIVERSAL COMPANY
OF THE MARITIME SUEZ CANAL45
The legal status of the company is summed up in its purpose. It is a
company charged with the exploitation of a public service. As such it
43 In 1956, the total income of the company was L 34,500,000 and the total ex-
penditures ( 18,300,000. The annual net profit of the company in 1956 was £ 10,700,000,
undoubtedly a profitable venture.
44 This financial data may be found in the documents of the Compagnie Universelle
du Canal de Suez; EL-HEFNAWY, op. cit. supra note 21; documents of the Egyptian
Ministry of Finance; Senate and House documents on budgets and finances, Egyptian
Senate Library, op. cit. supra note 41.
45 Faramans of Nov. 30, 1854 and Jan. 5, 1956; Convention of Feb. 22, 1866, supra
note 30.
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is (1) a public law entity4" insofar as its relations with the Egyptian
Government is concerned, and (2) an anonymous stockholders' cor-
poration.
THE COMPANY EXPLOITS OR MANAGES A PUBLIC SERVICE
48
It is established that states enjoy a discretionary power insofar as
the creation of public services is concerned. In effect, when a state
creates a public service it behooves it to adopt one of the recognized
types in administrative law. 49 This is established in the grant of the
public service concession, in which the state confers to an individual
or a corporate structure the administration of a public economic serv-
ice, the grantee frunishing, as its responsibility, management, labor,
capital or whatever is agreed upon. The grantee collects the fees from
the users of this public service.
The evaluation of the principle underlying the creation of a public
service has raised many problems of definition and distinction. How-
ever, it remains a fact that two important characteristics are indis-
pensable:
1. The manifestation of a public need to be satisfied.
2. The subjection of this public service to a system of public law
which allows it to follow means and procedures generally exclusively
within the province of the public powers, thereby guaranteeing the
continuity and efficiency of the needed service.
THE MANIFESTATION OF A PUBLIC NEED TO BE SATISFIED
It appears from the application of these general principles and in
light of the documents pertaining to the company that the venture's
46 Egyptian law is derived from the French civil code and is therefore a codified
system in which the private law regulates the relationship between individuals or
corporate structures, and public law regulates the relationship between individuals
and governmental or administrative functions.
47Pasley, The Interpretation of Government Contracts: A Plea for Better Under-
standing, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 211 (1956). Anonymous stockholders' corporations are
corporations under a special type of regulation which, unlike corporations in the United
States, have a different legal status, more like stocks listed on the market in contrast
with privately held stocks or those issued to a given name and not negotiable to the
bearer or on the market.
48 See discussion of government contracts in MITCHELL, THE CONTRACTS OF PUBLIC
AUTHORITY; 9 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS ch. XII (rev. ed. 1945); Miller, Government
Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary Inquiry, 41 VA. L. REV. 27 (1955).
49 European administrative law and Egyptian administrative law have the same
origin.
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purpose and duty were the creation and exploitation of a public service
and that it would bear all the inherent lements of a public service.50
It responded to a need of creating a navigable maritime waterway.51
To satisfy this need it extended from the Nile a navigable river called
the sweet-water canal. This provided water, needed for irrigation and
drinking, to the areas of the Canal constructions and adjacent areas
between the two extremities of the Canal. 52 In witness thereof, Article
1 of the first Faraman, dated November 30, 1854 and granting the
concession, states: "M. DeLesseps will form for the piercing of the
Isthmus of Suez ... and the exploitation, of a passage for great navi-
gation. . . ." Article 1 of the second Fararman of concession, dated Jan-
uary 5, 1856, states: "The Company... will have to execute all works
and constructions necessary for the establishment of:
I. A Canal appropriate to great navigation.
2. A Canal of irrigation appropriate to river navigation.
3. Two branches of a Canal for irrigation and alimentation."
The Convention dated February 22, 11366 states in Article 9: "The
Egyptian Government will enjoy the servitude of crossing the mari-
time Canal on the points on which it will judge necessary insofar as
its own communications are concerned as well as for the free circula-
tion of commerce." Egyptian law No. 73, dated July 31, 1937, refer-
ring to the Convention of 1866, enforces the company's obligation in
regard to other public needs, such as the maintenance of streets, side-
walks and parks of Ismailieh, the maintenance and protection of the
cemeteries, the sewage and the maintenance of the streets and parks of
Port-Tewfik. Egyptian law No. 130, dated August 15, 1940 and also
referring to the Convention of 1866, deals with the government's
agreement with the company in Article 14. The 1949 law goes on to
declare that from now on the municipality of Ismailieh will undertake,
in place of the company, the charges and obligations relating to mu-
nicipal services that the company had conducted so far in that city.
Article 17 of the same law provides that the company will deliver to
the government the sweet-water canal which was created for the pur-
pose of servicing the cities of Port Said, Kantara and the various in-
stallations of the Canal.
Prior to the two preceding laws, it was obvious that the company
50 EL-HEFNAWY, op. cit. supra note 21. See infra note 57.
51 For the purposes of the canal, see supra note 45.
52 See Faramans, supra note 27.
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had obligated itself to satisfy a public need. In regard to the legal
status that applies to a public service, it is established that the state
which creates such public service submits it to an order of public law,
since it has conferred upon the public service the necessary authority,
emanating from public law, in order to permit it to perform its pur-
pose.13 The intervention of the state in the administration of this pub-
lie service and the subjection of the latter to the status of public law
jurisdiction are recognized in the following documents. The first Fara-
man, dated November 30, 1854, declares:
Article Two-The Manager of the Company will always be nominated by
the Government.
Article Six-The tariffs and dues on passages through the Canal will be by
mutual consent between the Company and the Viceroy of Egypt.
Article Eleven-By-laws of the Company will be subject and will have to
bear our [the Viceroy's] approval. The modification that could be introduced
later will have to receive our [the Viceroy's] prior approval.
The first Faraman,54 granting the concession, stipulates in Article 6
that the tariffs and passage dues collected by the company will always
be equal for all nations without any particular advantage to one na-
tion or detriment to another. There again was an imposed control by
the Sovereign. The second Faraman,"5 dated January 5, 1856, re-
affirms the provisions of the first FaramanY'
This is why it is important to analyze the agreements between the
government and the company. These agreements are a series of con-
cessions and grants for the exploitation of a public service. These offi-
cial documents emanated from the Sovereign and under the Sover-
eign's authority. If we add that the agreements concluded between
the government and the company created an effective monopoly in
the company for the exploitation of the venture, we can reach the
inevitable conclusion that the company was in effect charged with the
creation and exploitation of a public service and that the entire ven-
ture was a public service.57
53 Supra notes 35 and 36.
54 Faraman of Nov. 30, 1954, supra note 27.
55 Faraman of Jan. 5, 1956, supra note 27.
56 Faramans, supra note 27.
57 DE LAUBADERE, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF (1957); PEQUIGNAT, THEORIE GENERALE DU
CONTRAT ADMINISTRATIF (1954); VEDEL, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF (1958); WALINE, DRorT
ADMINISTRATIF (1957); Langrod, Administrative Contracts: A Comparative Study,
4 AM. J. COMp. L. 325 (1955).
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THE PUBLIC SERVICE IS SUBJECTED TO A
SYSTEM OF PUBLIC LAW
An act of concession is "a legal act in virtue of which a person obli-
gates himself to an administrative authority to exploit a public service
at his expense and his risk in return for :the right to collect dues paid
by the beneficiaries (users) or to obtain subventions or financial ad-
vantages provided in the act of concession. '"58 Therefore, the idea of
concession of a public service rests on the following bases:
1. The undertaking is by an institution to organize and administer a public
service by means of private funds and under its own management. This
undertaking is stipulated in various documents concerning the company and
notably in Article 1 of the first Faraman granting concession and authorizing
the formation of a company for the piercing of the Isthmus and the exploita-
tion of an appropriate passage for (great:) navigation. Article 4 of the
same Faraman stipulates that all works will be done exclusively at the
expense of the company and Article 1 of the second Faraman stipulates
that the company will execute at its expen;e, risk and peril, all works and
construction necessary. Article 7 of the same Faraman stipulates that the
Martime Canal and dependent ports will be constantly maintained in good
condition by the company at its expense.
2. As developed above, the legal status of the project and the company was
for the "purpose of undertaking the exploitation of a venture which resulted
in a public service."
3. The undertaking by the grantee (concessionaire) is to assume all risks of
the enterprise and to exploit it in the name of a public administration. Article
5 of the first Faraman states: "The Egyptian Government will receive
annually from the Company, 15% of the net profits . . . without any
guarantee on its behalf of the execution of works or the operation of the
company ....." Article 3 of the first Faraman fixes the duration of concession
to ninety-nine years from the first day of the opening of the Canal connect-
ing the two seas. Article 10 of the same Faraman says that at the
expiration of the concession, the Egyptian Government will replace the
company and will enjoy without reserve all of its rights and will be in
possession of the Canal of the two seas and all the establishments depending
thereon. Therefore, the concessionaire is exploiting a public service for the
benefit of the Egyptian Government. The concession having been granted
for a determined period (ninety-nine years), the public service, including
installations, machinery, and materials, reverts to the Government at the
expiration of the concession. Article 16 of i:he second Faraman bears the
same tenor.
4. The compensation agreement to the concessionaire was under the form of
right to collect dues from the users of the Canal. The act of concession
determines the privileges of the company to collect passage dues according
to Article 6 of the first Faraman and Article 17 of the second Faraman.
58 This definition is paraphrased from various authorities and is in compliance with
those to be found in authorities cited supra note 57.
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Therefore, the Egyptian Government had granted the Suez Canal Company
a concession for the creation and exploitation of a public service and the
state, which reverts to such means to satisfy existing needs, confers to the
contractual concessionaire the quality of mandatee to execute a certain
task that the state itself should have undertaken. The qualifications of the
mandate by the government to the company are confirmed in the Faraman
of 1856 where Article 20 specifies "that independently of the necessary time
for the execution of these works, our friend and mandatee, Mr. F. DeLesseps,
will preside and manage the company."
From the above it is clear that we are dealing with a public service
company acting by mandate of the government to perform a public
service for a specified period of time and deriving its potential profit
from the collection of dues under the authority delgated by the state
and with the necessary grants and privileges indispensable to the exe-
cution of such an undertaking.
THE COMPANY IS A LEGAL ENTITY IN THE FIELD OF PRIVATE LAW
AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT
ARE OF A NATIONAL CHARACTER
We have demonstrated under what conditions and for what pur-
poses the Egyptian Government granted the company a concession
for the exploitation of a public service-primarily for navigation
through the Suez Canal."0 This company, created by public authority,
took the form of a legal entity in the field of private law." But, by its
creation in the field of public law, it is admitted that the status of a
legal entity is governed by an important principle of specialzation.01 In
more precise terms, a legal entity must undertake activities only within
the frame of its specialty, or field of pubic service.
When we refer to the docunents granting the concession, we real-
ize that it is the Egyptian Government that created the company by
conferring upon it the character of a legal entity. The creation of this
legal entity was for the purpose of a determined objective, namely, the
exploitation of one of the services that the Egyptian Government rec-
ognized as needed in Egyptian territory, and for the benefit of mari-
time traffic and commerce from which Egypt would benefit.6 2 No
50 Faraman of Nov. 30, 1854. 00 See supra notes 46, 47, 48 and 49.
61 See supra note 57, and LONG, WEIL, AND BRAIBANT, LES GRANDS ARRETS DE LA JURIS-
PRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE (1956).
62 The Preamble of the Faraman of Jan. 5, 1956, is entitled "Firman de Concession
et Cahier Des Charges Pour La Construction et L'Exploitation du Grand Canal Mari-
time de Suez et ses dependantes." "Cahier des Charges" is the book of charges or obli-
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other government can attribute to itself' any role in the creation and
exploitation of this public service, even though such foreign govern-
ment entertains relations with the concesionaire. By its formation and
composition, the concessionaire is a legal fiction depending on the
field of private law and bound to the government, which is an entity
dependent upon the field of public law. The nature of their relation-
ship is determined by the grant of concession."
The act granting the concession dermonstrates that the company
would not have acquired the necessary legal status to be legally rec-
ognized as properly acting under the laws of the country if it had not
fulfilled the foregoing requirements.
The formation of the company was prescribed by the grantor, by
virtue of Article 2 of the first Faraman which provided that the man-
ager of the company would always be appointed by the government.
Article 2 of the second Faraman stipulated that "the by-laws of the
Company will have to be submitted and bear our approval as well as
the name of its founders (charter members)." Article 9 of the second
Faraman reserved to the Egyptian Government the right to delegate
to the headquarters of the company a special commissioner that was
to represent it. Article 19 of the second Faraman stipulated that the
list of names of the founding member; (charter members) would
have to be decreed or embodied in the form of a decree to be promul-
gated by the Egyptian Government.
That the formation of the company was in conformity with the
laws and customs of Egypt is evidenced by the fact that it was consti-
tuted by a grant of concession from the Egyptian Government, there-
by creating the legal entity which is now the company. It is in this
order of thoughts that Article 21 of the second Faraman declared:
"Our approval of the by-laws of the Company created under the
name of the Universal Company of the Maritime Suez Canal and the
present approval authorizes the formation in the form of an anony-
mous corporation from the date on which the entire capital stock will
be underwritten."
gations that the grantee of a public service must perform. On the nature of the public
utility contract in French administrative law, see supra notes 46, 47, 48, 49, and 57.
The above Faraman (Firman) said in its Preamble: ". . . to constitute the above
mentioned company by the forms and condition; generally adopted by companies
(societies) of this nature...."
63 Supra notes 46, 47, 48, 49, 57, and 62.
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The company having conformed to these requirements and having
been constituted according to the legal provisions of the internal laws
rgulating the formation of an anonymous shareholders' corporation,
insures that the Egyptian Government recognizes the status of this
legal entity as an Egyptian corporation subject to the laws and cus-
toms of the territory, in witness of which was the provision of Article
16 of the Convention of February 22, 1866.
We should add that the preparatory works in view of the forma-
tion of the company were undertaken by two parties, on one hand,
M. F. DeLesseps, as an individual and not representing any state or
government, and, on the other hand, the same M. DeLesseps, this time
in his capacity as mandatee of the Egyptian Government, and that the
agreement itself was dealing with the exploitation of a local public
service. We can conclude again that the legal relationship that existed
between the nationalized company and the Egyptian Government had
a purely national character and did not bear any foreign or interna-
tional element. 4
THE SUEZ CANAL COMPANY, AN EGYPTIAN ANONYMOUS STOCKHOLDERS'
CORPORATION-SOCIETE ANONYME EGYPTIENNE (S.A.E.)
We have demonstrated that the company obtained its legal exist-
ence from national legislation under which it had been constituted, by
virtue of the power of the legitimate representative of the national or
public power, and that Article 21 of the second Faraman 5 authorized
and created the company under the form of "Societe Anonyme
Egyptienne."' 6 Under these conditions, it is indispensable to consider
that a company nationally constituted was so to the exclusion of any
other international or foreign power. 7 Although this elementary prin-
ciple is the basis of the Faraman, the author of the concession or grant
insisted upon confirming it with an explicit document which stipu-
lated: "The Suez Canal Company, being Egyptian, falls under the
laws and customs of the country." This is Article 16 of the Conven-
64 See Faramans, supra note 27.
65 Faraman of Jan. 5, 1856. 06 Supra p. 17.
67 DEVELLE, LA CONCESSION EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1936); 7 HACKWORTH, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 610 (1943); 2 HYDE, CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 988
(2d ed. 1945); 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 711 (1945); 6 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
703 (1906); Borchard, Contractual Claims in International Law, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 457
(1913); Carlston, Concession Agreements and Nationalization, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 260
(1958).
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tion of February 22, 1866. We have brought out this question of the
nationality of the company since it wa; put in issue by at least two
circumstances that we feel are quite interesting.
First Instance.-The Egyptian Government promulgated law num-
ber 35 on May 2, 1935, Article 1 of which stated that contracts re-
quiring payment in gold and which bear an international character are
null and void, with the exception of su:ch obligations undertaken in
virtue of conventions or agreements relative to postage, telegraphs and
telephones.
This law was invoked in three cases then pending in the Mixed
Courts.68 One of these cases was against the company. Its creditors
requested payment in gold, but the company had refused payment in
gold in compliance with the above mentioned legislation. In a decision
rendered February 26, 1940, the Appellate Mixed Court recognized
the validity of the gold clause contained in the legislation, determin-
ing that the 1935 gold legislation allowed gold payments only in re-
gard to state transactions, postage, telegraphs and telephones. The
court further stated that the purpose of cancelling obligations to pay
in gold was to prevent a depreciation of the national currency. The
creditors of the company contended that their obligation be paid in
gold or in a foreign non-depreciated currency because the users of
the Canal and of the company's services paid their dues in either gold
or foreign currencies. Therefore, they argued, the company could ful-
fill its financial obligations out of these collected dues and this would
not influence the national currency since said income in gold or for-
eign currency was not injected into the internal financial market. The
court concluded that the 1935 law was not applicable, either to the
rights of the company in collecting dues in gold or foreign currency
or to the obligations of the company to repay its creditors in the same
type of currency.69
In this decision, the court drew a paraillel to a similar case involv-
ing the Bank of the Credit Foncier,70 in which the court took notice
68 The Mixed Courts were established to try cases involving an Egyptian national
and a foreign national, or between foreign nationals, for any disputes arising in Egypt.
Judges and lawyers represented several foreign nations.
69 See MINISTRY OF INFORMATION OF EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, op. cit. supra note 41,
and EL-HEFNAWY, op. cit. supra note 21. See also Decisions of Appellate Mixed Court
of June 4, 1925; June 18, 1931; Feb. 26, 1940, Bullktin De Legislation et Jurisprudence
Egyptienne.
70 Supra note 69.
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that the activities of the bank were of a national and internal charac-
ter while the Suez Canal Company was an institution having a uni-
versal character insofar as its activities with various states were con-
cerned. The company had been created prior to the institution of the
Mixed Courts and it could not as a consequence oppose its creditors
under the provisions of the Commerce Code of the Mixed Courts. The
Bank of the Credit Foncier, continued the decision, was a Societe Ano-
nyme constituted in Egypt after the promulgation of the Mixed Court
legislation to which it is now subject. It was further noted that the
income of this bank was in local Egyptian currency while the income
of the company was in gold and foreign currency, and that the two
companies had different types of activities. The Mixed Court at-
tempted to protect the interests of foreign states and foreign creditors
against the company, while holding that it was an Egyptian company.
Although the decision was in favor of the creditors, it reaffirmed the
Egyptian nationality of the Company.
This decision involving the Suez Canal Company is an error in the
application of the law for the following reasons:
1. The 1935 Gold Act 7l is explicit insofar as the absolute cancellation of
any gold clause is concerned. An explanatory note accompanied the promulga-
tion of this law which clearly indicated that the cancellation was for the
purpose of putting an end to discrimination, established by the Mixed Courts,
between internal activity and external activity. Although the law excepted
certain payments made by the state or for postage, telegraphs and telephones,
the application of the law is unambiguous. As a general principle of law these
exceptions must be interpreted in the restrictive sense. Therefore, it does not
follow that the Mixed Courts can attribute themselves the power to search for
the hidden scope of the legislation in determining that the company's income
did not influence the national financial market.
72
2. It is obvious that the above law is a matter of public policy and as such
no interpretation thereof should differ from the obvious verbal context of the
legislation itself. This may be different in matters of private law which
regulate the relationship of individuals and in which the law may disgress from
the letter to the spirit of the transaction.
3. The argument invoked referring to the universal nature of the business
of the company confuses the service of the company with the administration
of the same. The service of the company may be universal but the company
itself, created under Egyptian laws as the administrator of a public service
limited within the confines of Egyptian territory, cannot be confused with the
type of service it renders, and certainly not with its name. This brings us
again to the example of the International Company of Wagon-Lits, which
administers a service of a much more universal character than the Suez Canal
71 Supra note 35.
72 See briefs of Government Attorney in cases cited in supra note 69.
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Company, since it extends its service outside the confines of the Belgian terri-
tory. However, it has never been contended that it is not a Belgian company
subject to Belgian laws.
At the time of this gold payments controversy, the British Govern-
ment had intervened in the action in it3 capacity as stockholder and
had presented to the Mixed Court the following argument: "The
company is a legal entity by virtue of the Egyptian law that regulates
it. Its nationality is therefore Egyptian and necessarily subject to
Egyptian laws."'73
The Appellate Mixed Court had recognized in two other decisions
the Egyptian nationality of the company. These decisions were ren-
dered on June 4, 1925 and June 18, 19--;1, and stated specifically that
the name of the company ". . . Universal, was due to the fact that it
was formed to gather capital from various parts of the world and that
it had to draft its documents in various ]anguages. ' 74
The Egyptian Government, in view of this erroneous application
of the 1935 Gold Act by the Mixed Courts and as a result of the
Mixed Court's misinterpretation of local laws in other instances which
infringed upon the national sovereignty, rendered Ordinance No. 113
through the military governor. Dated January 5, 1945, it suspended
the execution of the two decisions rendered by the Appellate Mixed
Court in regard to the Suez Canal Company ease and the Land Bank
case, which were based on the Credit Foncier case. The ordinance
suspending these two decisions had the nature of a legislative act (in
time of war) and reaffirmed the 1935 Gold Act by suspending a de-
cision contrary to the legislature's intent.
Second Instance.75-This was on the occasion of the promulgation
of the 1947 law regulating the anonymous stockholders' corporation-
Societe Anonyme Egyptienne.76 By vihtue of this law, the govern-
ment required that all boards of directors of corporations of this type
be comprised of a determined number of Egyptian members and that
the personnel of all such companies be composed of a determined
proportion of Egyptian employees.
73 See arnicus brief of the British Governmen:, which intervened in case decided
Feb. 26, 1940, supra note 69.
74 Supra note 69.
75 See MINISTRY OF INFORMATION OF EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, op. cit. supra note 41;
EL-HEFNAWY, op. cit. supra note 21. See also Suez Canal Company documents with
Egyptian Government, which are on file at the former offices of the Company in
Paris, France.
76 Supra note 35.
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The Suez Canal Company attempted to exempt itself from the ap-
plication of this law and presented a note77 in which it raised the
question of the applicability of the law to it. The note stated that the
contractual character that linked the company to the government re-
sulted from the Faramans, the decrees, and law No. 73 of 1937, and
that the Egyptian Government did not have a unilateral right to can-
cel rights granted to the company which were the basis of its eco-
nomic, legal, financial and technical structure. Furthermore, the note
stated, the company had vested rights derived from the act of conces-
sion and that the Egyptian Government had undertaken obligations
towards the company in virtue of which it had conferred upon the
company the privileges of administration, the piercing and exploita-
tion of the Canal, and a guarantee that the internal administration of
the company and its relations with the stockholders would be subject
to French law. It emphasized that these obligations bind the Egyptian
Government in the present and in the future, and that if not so bound,
the government could gradually withdraw all the privileges it had
granted the company and therefore the present instance was not a
matter of the application of a law, but a matter of respecting vested
rights and obligations undertaken previously. The note concluded that
the government could not undo its contractual obligations by promul-
gating a law. This would mean that any agreement concluded be-
tween the state and foreigners or foreign interests would be illusory
since it could be nullified by the promulgation of any law. 78
The government delegated Dr. W. Raafat r9 to reply to the note of
the company. His reply involved the following arguments:
1. The new law was promulagated as a matter of public policy and does not
effect prior vested rights. There is no doubt that the concession or grant
obtained by the company created juridical relations between the government
and the company which had developed consequences and situations giving
birth to what are now vested rights. The present legislation or future legisla-
tion could not modify them since it would infringe upon the legal principle of
the non-retroactivity of law. However, he pointed out that the legislation
applied to future results and future effects. Therefore, the by-laws of the
company, which determine the selection and composition of the board of
directors as well as the choice of its personnel, became subject to certain
77 Note to the Egyptian Government from die Suez Canal Company, Sept., 1947.
78 Full text of the note is in the records of Government notes and correspondence
of La Compagnie Universelle du Canal de Suez, former administrative offices of the
Company in Paris.
79 Legal scholar, former Professor of Law, University of Cairo, represented the
Egyptian Government in this exchange of legal notes.
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restrictions in 1937. Therefore, as the 1937 law imposed certain changes which
have not been disputed, the same is now true with the present legislation.
The present law says that a percentage of the members of the board of
directors, employees and laborers must be national citizens. The company
could not sustain the argument that it had -vested rights by virtue of which
only two Egyptian members could sit on it, board and this by virtue of the
1937 law. Neither could the company argue that the law would violate its
vested rights while other enterprises were subject to the same law and had to
hire a determined percentage of Egyptian personnel. The basis of this concept
is that this is a matter of public policy and that as such the government may
regulate such matters as it had embodied in this labor legislation. This is also
in agreement with eminent French jurists such as Dean Bedant, Prof. Laborde
La Coste and others who formulated the bulk of French theory and doctrine
of public law.80
Since the 1947 law was specifically directed toward the hiring of a greater
number of Egyptians in corporations exercis:;ng their activities in Egypt, it is
logical that it pertained to public policy and national interest. It is of little
consequence that the result of such legislation pertains to relations created by
public or private law since in itself this legislation was public law and was a
matter of unanimous agreement in the field of French doctrine and juris-
prudence.
2. The present legislation does not affect any basic obligation between the
parties since these contractual obligations were of two natures: (a) conditions
of generality and (b) specific contractual conditions. Conditions relating to the
status of personnel and employees are conditions of generality. They are
therefore subject to modifications by the government and such modifications
were in no way a breach of contractual obl:gations. The noted French legal
author, Duguit, and Prof. J6ze are in complete agreement, they being the
foremost authorities on the subject.
3. In regard to the company's argument that French law should apply, the
reply by Dr. W. Raafat 8l was that the Egyptian legislature was referring to
certain provisions in the then existing French laws which were lacking in the
Egyptain laws, which in respect to the subject matter had the same origin.
Article 16 of the Convention of February 22, 1866 declared that it was for the
purpose of implimenting Egyptian legislation and hence could be unilaterally
modified. Therefore, the reference to the applicability of a specific area of the
French law which was lacking in the Egyptian law cannot be considered as
an abandonment by the Egyptian legislature of its privilege to enact laws in
regard to corporations, which is the subject matter of this dispute. Egyptian
law derives from the French law, and that which was lacking in the Egyptian
law was gradually supplemented.
It is interesting to note at this point the decision of the International
Court of Lahaye in regard to matters of loans to Serbia and Brazil.
8ODean Bedant and Dean Lacoste, scholars and authors of many books and articles,
are former professors of law, University of Paris.
81 The above paraphrased and condensed opinion from Dr. W. Raafat's note is a true
representation of the spirit of the note and the arguments are identical. They also
represent the opinions of the author.
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The agreement thereby concluded was not considered an agreement
between states, insofar as states are subjects of international law, but
as based on national law.82 Therefore, the national law regulating the
activities of the Suez Canal Company, which is a company of Egyp-
tian nationality, is Egyptian law to the exclusion of any other law,
even though Egypt may wish to subject for a time a given aspect of
such activity to a foreign law or custom that she deems more favorable
or complete until such time as she would decide to eliminate the ap-
plication of such foreign law. This is merely the confirmation of a
sovereign prerogative.83
THE JURIDICAL NATURE OF THE ACTS OF CONCESSION BY A STATE
AND THE CONCESSION OF THE CANAL GRANTED BY EGYPT
French jurisprudence sustained various theories as to the interpreta-
tion of the nature of the right a state exercises on public property,
82 See MINISTRY OF INFORMATION OF EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, op. cit. supra note 41.
See also Decree, P.C.I.J., ser. II A, Nos. 10 and 21 (1939): "Every contract which is
not an international agreement-i.e., a treaty between states is subject (as matters
now stand) to municipal laws." Martini (Italy v. Venezuela), 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 554
(1931), held that there exists in several countries a well established jurisprudence
by which the rights of a grantee under a contract of concession are interpreted re-
strictively. International Fisheries Company (United States v. Mexico), [1930-1931]
Opinions of Comm'rs Under the Convention Concluded Sept. 8, 1923, Between the
United States and Mexico 207: "[This] was not an arbitrary act .. .which in itself
might be considered as a violation of some rule or principle of international law."
Case of the Serbian Loans, P.C.I.J., ser. A, Nos. 20--21 at 41 (1929): "Any contract
which is not a contract between states in its capacity or subjects of international law
is based on the municipal law of some country." Case of Hemming, Nielsen's Report 617
(1926), 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 292 (1921); The Abailard Case, 12 REv. GEN. DE D.I.P.,
Documents 12 (1905).
Amersinghe, States Breaches of Contract With Aliens, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 881 (1964),
stated that there is little or no evidence that any breach of such a contract by a state
has per se been treated as a breach of international law in any case. On the other hand,
there is evidence that such breaches per se have not been regarded as breaches of in-
ternational law. A breach of contract is not a breach of international law." Id. at 892.
83 Brandon, Legal Aspects of Private Foreign Investments, 18 FED. B.J. 298, 304
(1958): "The right of a state to nationalize any private property situated within
its territorial jurisdiction is not generally disputed. This is an essential attribute of
sovereignty." See also Hyde, Compensation for Expropriation, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 108
(1939); Kissam and Leach, Sovereign Expropriation of Property and Abrogation of
Concession Contracts, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 177, 194 (1959): "Whatever the status
of the law or of informed opinion may be as to the obligation of a state to pay compen-
sation to a foreign national whose property has been expropriated, there is substantially
unanimous agreement with the proposition that if compensation is paid .. .the state
has the power and the right under international law to expropriate ... within its terri-
torial jurisdiction . . . "; Joseph, International Aspects of Nationalization, 5TH CONF.,
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION (1954): "The right of a state to nationalize property
under its jurisdiction is unquestioned regardless of whether the owners be citizens or
aliens."
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and the nature of grants and concessions thereof.8 4 Toward the end of
the nineteenth century, the trend was toward the application of prin-
ciples of public law to public property. Gradually, courts followed
this tendency in their decisions and this evolution is now established
law.
It is indisputable that the area in which the Canal was pierced and
the property on which buildings and installations are in existence are
part of Egyptian territory, since they arc within Egypt's international
borders. Thus, the right exercised by the state on such property is a
property right derived from the public law. Under these conditions,
could the concession granted for the exploitation of the Maritime Suez
Canal modify this juridical situation? In other words, is the grant of a
concession for a given period of time (ninety-nine years)85 an act
which would affect the property rights of Egypt on its public terri-
tory?
Article 87 of the Egyptian Civil Code states:
"1. Property of public domain is real property and personal property
belonging to the state and to other legal entities of the public law, and
affected by assignment either in fact by law or a decree to a public service or
public utility."
"2. These properties are inalienable, unattachable and not subject to statutes
of limitations [adverse possession]." Article 88 of the Code says: "The proper-
ties of public domain regain their character if they stop being assigned to a
public utility service and if this is done in fact by law or by decree or when-
ever the public utility or public service to w hich they are assigned is termi-
nated."80
The rationale of public property and public domain is based upon
the need to satisfy a public service, a public order, a public utility or a
public need, unlike that of private property, which benefits the
owner.8 7 Since the grant by the Egyptian Government for the exploi-
tation of the Suez Canal was a concession of some of the public prop-
erty reserved for public utility, and since this public property was
part of the entire public domain, this property enjoys the immunity
84 LONG, WELL, AND BRAIBANT, op. cit. supra note 61.
85 Faraman of Jan. 5, 1956, art. 16, supra note 27.
8 6 SANHOURY, EL-WAssT, which is his interpret.tion in a three volume book of the
Egyptian Civil Code. Dr. Sanhoury is former Professor of Law, Dean of Cairo Uni-
versity Law School, and former Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the 1958
Egyptian Constitution.
8 7 DE LAUBADERE, op. cit. supra note 57; SANHOURY, op. cit. supra note 86; TAMAWY,
ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW; WALINE, op. cit. supra nol:e 57. Tamawy is Assoc. Professor
of Law, Cairo University.
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provided for in Article 87, paragraph 2 of the Egyptian Civil Code.
It follows that the Canal and surrounding territory are in the category
of public property, reserved and assigned to a public utility, and can-
not become the private property of the company, the grantee.8 8
It is in the application of this principle of public domain property
that the French Conseil D'Etat (the French Administrative Court)
decided that the coal extracted from the areas of Wahran through the
labor of the grantees of a concession was the property of the state be-
cause the assignment of this area for use by a public utility did not
vest ownership in the grantee, and would not involve any of the prop-
erty within the land not destined for the purpose of the public utility.
In regard to property assigned to a public utility, the state maintains
the status of ownership and the authority to exercise its police power,
public policy, and public hygene statutes.8" We have no difficulty find-
ing that these inherent qualities of public domain exist in all documents
and concessions pertaining to the Suez Canal Company.
THE ASPECTS OF OWNERSHIP BY THE EGYPTIAN STATE APPEAR
FROM THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS
90
1. Article 4 of the Convention of February 22, 1866, dealing with
properties necessary for the creation of the Canal and the construc-
tion of buildings and warehouses, provided: "The Company cannot
use any of these territories for the purpose of speculation. It will re-
turn the property either for agriculture, erection of buildings or
whenever population increase will so require. .. ."
It appears from this provision that in granting the company the
necessary territory and property for the exploitation of the enterprise,
the Egyptian Government had no intention of transferring title or
ownership of said property, but only intended to put it to the service
of the project, prohibiting the company from making use of this
property in speculation, sales, or other unintended uses. This clearly
strips from the company any incident of ownership that it may have
claimed over said territory.
2. Article 18 of the second Faraman of 1866, relative to the con-
cession, stated: "However, in view of the grants of property and
88 This also appears from the ban on land speculations in the Faraman of Jan. 5, 1856,
art. 4, supra note 27. Art. 16 limits the period of said grant to ninety-nine years and
Art. 13 refers specifically to "public domain" of the property.
89 EL-HFNAWY, op. cit. supra note 21; TAMAWY, Op. cit. supra note 87.
90 EL-HEFNAWY, op. cit. supra note 21; Scelle, La nationalization du Canal de Suez,
supra note 21.
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other advantages granted to the Company by the preceding articles,
we reserve as profit for the Egyptian Gcvernment a share of 15 % of
the yearly profits of the Company."
3. Paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the Convention of February 22, 1866
affirmed that the Egyptian Government will enjoy the use of the
property hereby assigned to the public utility without payment to the
company-grantee.
This established that the state-grantor had continued to exercise its
authority on the property belonging to ii: even after its assignment to
the public utility by means of concession, in witness of which Article
9 of the second Faraman of 1866 stated: "The Egyptian Government
will enjoy free passage through the Canal and the Company will not
be permitted to collect any dues from the Government."
Article 11 of the same Convention contained a similar provision
prescribing that the State continue to exercise its authority on the
property subject to the concession for the public service. "The Egyp-
tian Government ... will use for its administrative services (post of-
fice, customs) any place it will judge convenient ... ; in this event,
the Government will reimburse the Company for the sums that the
Company would have spent to create cr appropriate this property
which it will hold to use."
4. Article 16 of the second Faraman granting concession dealt with
the termination and expiration date of the concession. This article
formally affirmed the right of the Egyptian Government to repossess
or re-enter its public property, which includes the Maritime Canal, the
property, buildings and equipment of the company at the expiration
of the ninety-nine-year concession.
It appears clearly from these documents that the Egyptian Govern-
ment continued to exercise its rights and privileges during the entire
period of concession in its dual capacity as owner of the public prop-
erty and as the public power exercising governmental control, includ-
ing its public authority.
ASPECTS OF THE POLICE AUTHORITY OF THE
EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT
9 1
The police authority exercised by the Egyptian Government as part
of its sovereignty is clarified by the following documents:
1. Article 9 of the Convention of February 22, 1866 stipulated that,
"The Maritime Canal and its installations zemain subject to the Egyp-
91 EL-HEFNAWY, op. cit. supra note 21; Delson, supra note 21; Scelle, La nationaliza-
tion du Canal de Suez, supra note 21; Note, 70 HARV, L. REv., supra note 21.
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tian police who will freely exercise authority as on any other point of
the territory so as to assure the good order, the public security, and
the execution of laws and regulations of the country." Article 10 of
the Same Convention provided: "The Egyptian Government will oc-
cupy within the perimeter of the property reserved for the Maritime
Canal any position on any strategical point it will judge necessary to
the defense of the Country." These quotations reaffirm the sover-
eignty of the Egyptian state.
The Canal and other grants of lands and property are for a limited
period of time and to fulfill the need of an exploiting public service.
Added to its general authority, Egypt specified its particular police
power over these propertes. These documents reaffirmed powers a sov-
ereign state uses in the exercise of its sovereignty over its entire ter-
ritory without distinction or reservation. (This was also reaffirmed in
the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936, in the 1937 Convention, as well
as in the 1888 Convention. As discussed earlier, this last Convention
is the basis of the international obligations assumed by the Egyptian
Government.)
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, notwithstanding all these proofs and demonstra-
tions, the powers of Western Europe, when gathered at the 1956
Lancaster House Conference in London, attempted to confer an inter-
national quality or capacity upon the company-grantee, which, as
previously demonstrated, is an Egyptian company, Societe Anonyme
Egyptienne. This Conference attempted to internationalize the Canal.
The idea of internationalizing the Canal came from this "Users Club"
Conference. The users thought that their rights were in jeopardy be-
cause of the unprofessional and inexperienced management of the
Canal by the Egyptian Government and claimed international rights
under the 1889 Convention. The allegations were that Egypt violated
the users' rights protected by the 1888 Convention and therefore
breached an international duty requiring a remedy. 92
THE LEGAL PROVISIONS IN FAVOR OF THIRD PARTY
BENEFICARIES (USERS)
This is a thesis based on French administrative law better known
as "Ayants Droit.' 93 The French administrative court, the Conseil
92 See New York Times, July 27, Aug. 1, Aug. 4, Oct. 9, Oct. 13, 1956, and Time,
Oct. 1, 1956, for political statements regarding the Suez Canal.
9a DE LAUBADERE, op. cit. supra note 57; LONG, WELL, AND BRAIBANT, Opi. Cit. supra
note 61; WALINE, op., cit. supra note 57.
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D'Etat, had a tendency at its inception to recognize the right of a
third party requesting the enforcement of a privilege under a grant.
9 4
When a public authority delegated to a -:rivate party an obligation to
conduct a public service, the duties imposed were entered into a special
document called "Cahier Des Charges," meaning "Record of Duties."
Considering that the act between the public powers and the grantee
obligated the latter to offer to anybody upon request the service or
utility provided in the grant, under these terms any third party who
desires this use or benefit found its rights in the act of grant, which
was partly a contractual obligation. Therefore, the users for whom
the utility or service was created were considered to have a right, based
upon the grant, to the services of the public utility. As a general rule,
third party beneficiaries cannot invoke the contract between the
grantor and grantee even though the grantee's public service will ulti-
mately benefit these third parties. 5
The public service company-grantee i; in a contractual relationship
with the state-grantor under a juridical position regulated only by
the acts of grant and the legislation regarding public utilities or public
services within the administrative laws, i.e., public law. In conse-
quence, a provision for the benefit of any user or "Ayants Droit"
(third party beneficiaries) must be stipulated in the act of grant.
These stipulations do not create a right in the third party beneficiary
since the third party beneficiary is a person in the private field of law
who could not be a contractual party to the grant, which falls under
the field of public law. The grant itself contains organic provisions
and statutory regulations involving the grantor and the grantee, and
other provisions, established for third party beneficiaries, which could
not be considered in the light of private contract law. These provi-
sions in favor of third party beneficiaries are in a statutory form obli-
gating the grantee to perform a specific: service or duty which will
benefit the third party beneficiary. The organic provisions and statu-
tory regulations of such a public service contract remain subject to
the modifications of the grantor for reasons he may deem needed for
the benefit of the public service and the users. The third party bene-
94 LONG, WElL, AND BRAIBANT, op. cit. supra note 61.
95 Supra note 57. FRIEDMANN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1953) at 126:
"The concept of acquired rights is obscured, ambiguous and undefinable; that it finds no
support in international judicial decisions, that it cannot therefore be raised to the
dignity of a principle of international law.. .. "
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ficiaries cannot formulate objections or requests indicating their re-
quirements other than through the grantor. We refer also to the
declaration made by the Minister of French Communications in the
1908 Session of the French Parliament, which reflected the same
opinion.90 It is clear, therefore, that the third party beneficiary or user
cannot compel a grantor to change or amend its agreements with the
grantee under the concept that as third party beneficiary he has rights
either vested or in future.07
As a consequence, there is no relationship between the grant to the
Universal Company and the regulations established in the 1888 Con-
vention, which incidentally gave rise to an international juridical situ-
ation many years after the legal relationship was established between
the Egyptian Government and the company. The company, as an
entity dependent upon the field of private (corporation) law, could
not participate and in fact did not participate in the International Con-
vention of 1888. Such a Convention remains within the initiative and
sole competence of a sovereign state exercising its rights on its
territory.98
We cannot conclude this section without making reference to the
fact that the rights of a third party beneficiary under the Convention
of 1888, and as mentioned in the acts of grant, pertain to a "vessel" 99
requiring passage through the Canal and being discriminated against.
The only contractual obligation imposed by the state in the act of
grant seems to be the free and unmolested passage of any vessel re-
gardless of its flag or the nationality of its owner and subject only to
war restrictions between Egypt and the country seeking the passage
of its vessels.100
96 FRENCH CONGRESSIONAL RECORD (1908).
97 Meron, Repudiation of Ultra Vires State Contracts and the International Respon-
sibility of States, 6 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 273, 288 (1957): "It is sometimes said that
contracts affecting the attributes of national sovereignty ... do not create vested rights,
and that there is no responsibility for their repudiation by the contracting state ......
Meron contends that the basis of the State's responsibility is damages, and that compen-
sation dissolves any further liability of that state. See also Committee on the Study of
Nationalization of the American Branch of the International Law Association, Na-
tionalization of the Property of Aliens, 13 REcoRI OF N.Y.C.B.A. 367, 369 (1958).
98 The first Faraman was signed in 1854. See also Faraman of 1856, supra note 27, and
Convention of 1888, supra note 30.
99 See Convention of Constantinople of 1888, supra note 27, and Finch, supra note 21.
100 Supra notes 21 and 99.
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IS THE NATIONALIZATION AN ILLICIT ACT IN THE
MEANING OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW?1°1
THE, LEGAL STATUS OF THE NATIONALIZATION
As mentioned above, it is the unanimous opinion of the legal doc-
trine and jurisprudence in France and Egypt that the grant has a
double nature by the fact that it consists of two types of conditions: 1
02
(1) contractual conditions and (2) organic conditions.
The contractual conditions imply mutual obligations determined
by both parties such as assistance, guaran tee of interest, assumption of
expenses and distribution of profits. These obligations may be bilateral
or unilateral. It is, however, the opposite when we deal with organic
conditions because they refer to the method of the exploitation of the
public service objective of the concession and are only unilateral im-
positions by the grantor. This is considered the law that governs the
grant.
We are concerned with the withdrawal of the grant by the Egyp-
tian Government from the Company prior to its expiration'0 3 (eight-
een years earlier). The French judicial decisions hold that if a public
service does not produce the expected results the administrative pow-
ers may terminate the grant. 0 4 The French Conseil D'Etat, the high-
est administrative court, has also been of this opinion and French law
No. 129 of 1949 declares, in article 4, that the grant must express the
conditions and methods of withdrawal of a grant from a public service
if contemplated prior to its expiration date.' 05
Although the documents granting the exploitation of the service
101 BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 636 (2d ed. 1962), section on tortious conduct;
GUGGENHEIM, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1953), chapter on L'acte Illicit en
Droit International; FoumLoux, LA NATIONALISATION ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC,
THESIS AIX-EN PROVENCE (1960); WORTLEY, Op. cit. supra note 19; Juridical Aspects of
Nationalization and Foreign Property, 49 INT'L LAW ASS'N REP. 175-244 (1960);
WORTLEY, Observations on Public and Private Lawv Relating to Expropriation, 5 AM.
J. Comp. L. 577 (1956).
102 DE LAUBADERE, op. cit. supra note 57; LONG, WELL, and BRAIBANT, op. cit. supra
note 61; MITCHELL, op. cit. supra note 48; PEQUIGNAT, Op. cit. supra note 57; TAMAWY,
op. cit. supra note 87; VEDEL, op. cit. supra note 57; WALINE, Op. cit. supra note 57;
WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra note 48; Langrod, supra note 57; see also supra notes 46, 47, 48,
and 49.
103 Faraman of Jan. 5, 1856, art. 16, supra note 27.
104 Supra note 102; see Meron, supra note 96, and MOUSKELLY, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
which is an intensive study on this matter.
105 On French administrative law, see supra note 102.
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of the Canal did not provide for or anticipate the withdrawal of the
grant prior to its expiration date, it still remains the privilege of the
grantor to reassume the public service even though prior to the end
of the grant. This coincides with French jurisprudence. 10 The limi-
tation (if we may call it such) in law No. 129 of 1941107 had the
purpose of allowing the grantee to recoup or recover its investments
in the enterprise. 08 The fabulous amounts representing the annual
income of the stockholders of the company, and Egypt's payment of
almost 80% of the cost of the Canal in addition to the 120,000 Egyp-
tian lives lost while completing the piercing of the Canal, indicate
clearly that the investments by the stockholders have long been re-
covered.' 09 By the very provisions of the grant, the Egyptian Govern-
ment found itself in the position of doing one of two things:
1. It could put an end to the concession prior to its expiration since
it alleged grave infractions" of contractual obligations by the com-
pany leading to a breach of contract. 1" In this case, the public au-
'ooSupra note 102. See FENWicK, INTERNATIONAL LAW (3rd ed. 1948), at 292:
.. . [plersons entering into such contracts do so with a knowledge of the risks involved
and with expectations of correspondingly large returns upon their investment;" O'CoN-
NELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION (1956), at 271: "Another alleged justification
for the right of a state to abrogate a contract is based upon a sort of contractual
assumption of risk"; and Hendryx, A Sovereign Nation's Legal Ability to Make and
Abide by a Petroleum Concession Contract, PLATT's OILGRAM NEWS SERVICE (N.Y. ed.
Apr. 28, 1959), who supports the proposition that the service of their people requires
that on proper occasions governments must be released from, or be able to override
their contractual obligations by citing three United States Supreme Court decisions:
Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847); Marcus Brown Co. v. Feld-
man, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); and W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
107French law No. 129 (1941), Official Law Reports; DALLOZ, NOVEAU REPERTOIRE.
108 This is equivalent to the right of compensation in international law. See FENWICK,
op. cit. supra note 106; O'CONNELL, op. cit. supra note 106. See also EINAUDI, BYi, and
Rossi, NATURALIZATION IN FRANCE AND ITALY (1955); Doman, Postwar Nationalization
of Foreign Property in Europe, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 1125 (1948); O'Connell, Unjust
Enrichment, 5 Am. J. CoMp. L. 2 (1956).
109 Supra notes 106, 107, and 108. See "Financial Aspects," MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
OF EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, op. cit. supra note 41.
110 The Government issued a note of explanation following the nationalization law.
The note declared the discovery of serious contractual breaches by the Company
which justified the termination of the concession.
111 On international law and compensation, see CAVAREZ, LA PROTECTION DES DROITS
CONTRACTUELS RECCOUNUS PAR LES ETATS A DES ETRANCERS A L'EXCEPTION DES EMPRUNTS
(1956); FOIGHL, NATIONALIZATION; A STUDY IN THE PROTECTION OF ALIEN PROPERTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1957); Abdel-Wahab, Economic Development Agreements and
Nationalization, 30 U. CINC. L. REV. 418 (1961); Hjerner, The General Approach to
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thority could have made use of the power of seizure or sequestration,
which are both methods tolerated under French law as methods of
dealing with irregularities or breaches of contractual obligations by
public services and public utilities." 2
2. The government could just withdraw the concession by a uni-
lateral act based upon considerations of public policy which only the
state may determine. In this case, the withdrawal of the concession
differs from the method of seizure in that it allows the grantee a right
to indemnification. 113
In selecting the second procedure, the government granted proper
indemnification without artificially diminishing or reducing the actual
value of the stock of the company on the Paris stock market. This
act in itself is legal, and recognized by both the Egyptian and French
law, even though the withdrawal was not antcipated or expected
in the grant itself. 14
We deal with France as an example since, as previously mentioned,
most of the Egyptian law has its source in French law. There was a
very large scale of nationalization in France, involving all military
Foreign Confiscations, SCANDINAVIAN SnDIES IN LAW (1958); Kissam and Leach, supra
note 83.
112 On the theory of French administrative law, see DE LAUBADERE, Op. Cit. supra
note 57; WALINE, op. cit. supra note 57. See also MINAUDi et al., op. cit. supra note 108;
KRZYANOWSKI, QUELQUES DEVELOPPEMENTS RFCENIS EN MATIERES DE NATIONALISATION DE
LA PROPRIETE PRIVE ETRANGERE (Thise, Doctorat, Univ. of Paris 1961); Allison, Cuba's
Seizures of American Business, 47 A.B.A.J. 48-5 L, 187-191 (1961); Baade, Indonesian
Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Court.;-A Reply, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 801
(1960); Doman, supra note 108; Domke, On the Nationization of Foreign Shareholders'
Interests, 4 N.Y.L.F. 46 (1958); McNair, supra note 14; Comment, Cuban Nationaliza-
tion Decree Reviewed under International Law, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 155 (1962); Note,
49 CALIF. L. REV., supra note 19.
113 See Brandon, supra note 83; Hyde, supra note 83; Joseph, supra note 83; Meron,
supra note 97; Rubin, Nationalization and Compensation: A Comparative Approach,
17 U. CHI. L. REV. 458 (1950); Draft Resolutioz's on the Effects of Nationalizations,
ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1950).
114 There is great confusion in the area o. expropriation, nationalization and
withdrawal of grants not only in international law but in national laws under a civil
code and a separate administrative system of jurisdiction. We have tried to approach
the problem from its national law sources and examine its effects in international law
where nationalizations are generally recognized and admitted, subject to prompt,
adequate, and just compensation. For compens'ation in international law, see supra
notes 83, 84, 93, and 113. For administrative k.w and administrative contracts, see
DE LAUBADERE, op. cit. supra note 57; LONG, WEIL, and BRAIIANT, Op. cit. supra note 61;
SHEHATA, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1955); VEDEL, op. cit. supra note 57;
WALINE, op. cit. supra note 57; and infra notes 118 and 119.
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industries, the Renault Industries, the "Gnome and Rhone" Company
(River Navigation), the Company of "Transport Aerien" (now Air
France), the gas and electricity companies, "Houilleres et Charbon-
nages" (mining and coal industry), the "Societe Nationale de Presse"
(printing and publishing of newspapers), banks, insurance companies
and many other industries which are of less importance. At the time
this was justified and legally sustained by French law, doctrine, and
jurisprudence." 5 England is another example. When the Labor Party
was in power, it nationalized all industries dealing with coal, gas,
electricity, railroads, airlines, telephones, telegraphs, the Bank of Eng-
land, coal and steel.
Many examples of nationalization are found all over the world.
Some countries deal with a given service, such as Mexico, which
nationalized all petroleum industries. Other countries, such as France
and England, nationalized a vast group of industries."'
However, it is unfortunate that because of political considerations,
when the Egyptian Government, based on the same legal principles
and following examples set by France and England, who have both
left their imprint and influence in Egypt, decided on July 26, 1956
to nationalize the Suez Canal Company, a pandemonium developed
in Western Europe and was lead by those same countries which pre-
ceded Egypt in the field of nationalization in its various forms.117 As
mentioned above, the nationalized company, as a corporation, was in
the field of private law, its relationship with the Egyptian Govern-
ment had a purely national character, the company exploited a public
service in virtue of a concession granted by Egyptian public author-
ity, and the state had a right to nationalize, with compensation, a
public service for considerations of public policy. 118
115 Supra notes 106, 107, 108, and 112, 113, and 114.
116 On the nationalizations by Mexico and the General Claims Commission es-
tablished between Mexico and the United States, see Bisnop, op. cit. supra note 2.
117 See Statement by Secretary of State Dulles, DEPT. OF STATE BULL. No. 33, p. 335
(1956).
118 On the effects of nationalizations and right to nationalize in international law,
see Kissam and Leach, supra note 83, at 214: "Unless restricted by treaty or other
agreement a state has the right under international law to expropriate property of
foreign nationals within its territorial jurisdiction but only if the expropriation is made
for reasons of public utility and only upon the payment of prompt, adequate and
effective compensation. The requirement of compensation is equally applicable in
cases of both general and individual expropriation."
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THE LEGALITY OF THE NATIONALIZATION IN THE SENSE OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW" 9
The nationalization of the company in the view of public interna-
tional law is a purely internal matter, 120 as it arises from principles of
sovereignty and independence.' 2 ' Every state can regulate transactions
in her own territory, allow the economic regimes that she considers
most advantageous for her needs, and nationalize when necessary.
These rights have been recognized by the United Nations resolution
of the General Assembly, December 21, 1952, No. A-626-VIII,
which declares that it is a "sovereign and inalienable right of every
state to freely dispose of her natural wealth. . . . [This] is fully in
agreement with the goals and principles of the United Nations Char-
ter." This resolution invites the member states to respect this right
and to abstain from any action tending to compromise it. The com-
pany, as demonstrated, was not an entity within the field of inter-
national law; was not created through an international act; after it
was created, it did not develop any international obligation; and the
nationalization, applying exclusively to the company by means of
withdrawing its concession, does not constitute an international act
and therefore cannot violate an international obligation. 22
In reference to what we mentioned concerning the required con-
ditions for the imputation of an illicit act in international law, we can-
not find a transgression by Egypt of an international obligation or
agreement, and in application of the principles of the act of transgres-
sion in international law, we cannot find that Egypt failed in any way
119 Supra note 118. On the validity of nationalizations, see HYDE, INTERNATIONAL
LAw 650 (1947): "A state enjoys an exclusive right to regulate matters pertaining
to the ownership of property of every kind which may be said to belong within its
territory." See also BISHOP, op. cit. supra note 2; GUGGENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 1;
KATZAROv, THi ORIE DE LA NATIONALISATION NEUCHATEL (1960); OPPENHEIM, Op. cit. supra
note 2; Brandon, supra note 83; Domke, supra notes 18 and 112; Hyde, supra note 83;
Joseph, supra note 83; Katzarov, L'ordre public international et les nationalisations,
22 REv. INT'L FRANAISE DU DROIT DES GENS 13 (1951); KATzAzov, Validity of the Act of
Nationalisation in International Law, 22 MODERN L. REv. 639 (1959); Rubin, supra
note 113.
120 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
121 Id. See also U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. supra note 26; Tripartite Statement, supra
note 26. On the validity of nationalizations based upon the principle of sovereignty,
see supra note 119.
122 U.N. CHARTER. See also EL-HEFNAWY, op. cit. supra note 21; Scelle, La nationali-
zation du Canal de Suez, supra note 21; Note, 70 HARV. L. REv., supra note 21.
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to exercise an international duty or obligation resulting from inter-
national public law, by nationalizing an Egyptian company. 123
It remains for us to determine in what way Egypt may have vio-
lated international law. Therefore, we must find a duty arising out of
an international treaty or the breach of a general principle of inter-
national law bearing upon the rights of a state or of a legal entity
created by international law, such as an international organization. 24
As we have demonstrated, there was no breach of an international
duty arising from an international agreement or convention. 2 5 It re-
mains to be seen in what way the company could contend it was an
international legal entity, on subject to international diplomatic pro-
tection or international extra-territoriality. 126
This contention unfortunately arises out of the declaration of
August 2, 1956, promulgated by the governments of France, Great
Britain and the United States, which tended to give the character of
an international institution (maybe similar to the United Nations) to
the company, and also to establish rights for the users in the manage-
ment of the company and in the administration of the Canal, in view
of their rights, as third party beneficiaries, to free passage and free
navigation. 27
However, as demonstrated above, the rights of third party bene-
ficiaries128 are limited to those certain rights restrictively enunciated
by the 1888 Convention of Constantinople which gave Egypt the ex-
clusive right and prerogative of application and execution of the
principles with measures it judges opportune to take.120 Regardless of
the legal arguments that anybody brought concerning the fact that
the company did not have an international legal status, the influence
of the great political powers overrode all legal argument.130
123 See BISHOP, op. cit. supra note 2 and supra notes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
124 Kissam and Leach, supra note 83.
125 The only international treaty involved was the Convention of 1888, supra note 27
(which was not breached and is still in force). See U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC., supra
notes 26 and 35.
126 La Compagnie Universelle du Canal de Suez pretended to have some sort of spe-
cial international status in view of its universal service. See Scelle, La nationalization du
Canal de Suez, supra note 21.
127 See Tripartite Statement, supra note 26.
128 See supra notes 93, 94, 95, and 96.
129 See supra note 27 and EL-HEFNAWY, op. cit. supra note 21.
13 0 See supra note 117.
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The services rendered by the company, just as the Canal itself, are
of international importance and universal utility to the world. How-
ever, the character of the company as well as the territory 
that the
Canal crosses is definitely national, and the importance of the service
rendered by the company cannot, under our present legal system and
our present international law, give any legal status to a local company
other than the one for which its grantor created it.'3'
There was a theory used in 1956, which was derived from Ameri-
can international law doctrine 132 regarding companies to which the
United States could grant diplomatic protection if more than 50%
of the stockholders are Americans. However, this theory as used by
the conference of the users of the Canal was totally out of order and
there is no doubt that the percentage of ownership of a corporation's
stock does not determine its character or its nationality and certainly
does not give it extra-territoriality for foreign diplomatic protection.
The purpose of this doctrine or any similar diplomatic' protection
doctrine is exclusively for restitution or indemnification which is also
an established principle of international law.
This leaves the problem of indemnification and the methods of pay-
ment of said indemnity. If Egypt had refused indemnification to the
stockholders of foreign nationality, I would agree that the states
whose citizens had been deprived of their property or refused indem-
nification could and should be protected by proper diplomatic action
to obtain indemnification for their citizens.13' The argument dealing
with diplomatic protection is therefore overthrown by its own pur-
poses. These purposes are the negotiations for remuneration and ade-
quate indemnification of the injured party.13 4 The allegedly injured
parties (stockholders) were granted their due rights without negoti-
ations and there was no question as to the fairness or adequacy of the
indemnification. The basis for repayment was the price of the stock
131 See Faramans supra note 27.
132 Allison, supra note 112; Domke, supra notn 18; Stokes, Some Aspects of the
Protection of Foreign Investment under Interna.'ional Law, PROCEEDINGS AND COM-
MITrEE REPORTS, INT'L LAW ASS'N, AMERICAN BRANCH 19 (1959-60); Wetter, Diplomatic
Assistance to Private Investment; A Study of the Theory and Practice of the United
States During the Twentietb Century, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 275 (1962).
133 Supra note 132.
134 The entire purpose of diplomatic protecdorn is to ensure prompt, adequate and
just compensation. See supra note 132 and discussicn of compensation in supra notes 83,
111, and 113.
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at the closing of the Paris market the day before the nationalization,
July 26, 1956. The events had even then outgrown the alleged
problem.13 5
Egypt, by virtue of her sovereign rights as recognized by the
United Nations Charter1 36 and by general principles of public inter-
national law, nationalized a local company. Egypt gave all the stock-
holders, whether foreign or national, just compensation. The Act of
Nationalization did not apply to an international legal entity, nor did
it abrogate an international right. The act did not constitute a trans-
gression in the sense of public international law and therefore Egypt
cannot be said to have committed an illicit act, in the sense of inter-
national law or recognized principles as established by valid prece-
dents. The Act of Nationalization was a purely national matter giving
rise to no right of international interference or sanction and any such
unjustifiable act by any nation would constitute a transgression of
Egypt's right to dispose of property under her jurisdiction and within
her own boundaries.
135 Law of Nationalization of July 26, 1956 (no. 385 [1956]) (Egypt), art. 1: ".
The stockholders and bearers of founding shares will be compensated for their
stocks and shares which they hold on the computed value of closing quotations of the
Paris Stock Market for the day preceeding the date of issuance of this law. This
compensation shall be paid after the state will have taken possession of all funds and
assets of the nationalized company."
136 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
